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July 1, 2026
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Hollinger v. Dietrich, — A.3d —-, 2026 PA Super 133, 2026 WL 1800499, No. 740 MDA 2025 (Pa. Super. June 23, 2026).

For anyone litigating residential real estate disputes in Berks County, this decision is a sharp reminder that the clock on a seller disclosure claim runs from settlement and does not stop for a leaky basement discovered later.

On June 23, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania issued a published opinion affirming the Berks County Court of Common Pleas in Hollinger v. Dietrich. In an opinion authored by Judge King, the Court affirmed a series of rulings by the Honorable Madelyn S. Fudeman that dismissed home buyers’ claims arising from undisclosed water infiltration. In doing so, the Court held, on an issue of first impression, that the two-year deadline under the Real Estate Seller Disclosure Law, the Disclosure Law (RESDL), is a statute of repose, and that a Seller Disclosure Statement barred by that repose period cannot be repurposed to support collateral common-law and consumer-protection claims.

Key takeaways:

• The Disclosure Law’s two-year deadline is a statute of repose. Under 68 Pa.C.S.A. § 7311(b), the clock runs from final settlement regardless of when a defect surfaces. Because the statute’s title does not control its plain text, neither the discovery rule nor equitable tolling applies.
• You cannot recycle time-barred Disclosures. Once that repose period runs, the Disclosures cannot be used to prop up UTPCPL, breach-of-contract, or negligence claims, because doing so would impermissibly expand remedies under Section 7311(a).
• Agent liability requires actual knowledge. Real estate licensees have no duty to conduct independent inspections or verify representations under 63 P.S. § 455.606a(i); “they lived in the neighborhood, so they must have known” will not carry a nondisclosure claim.
• Plead fraud with particularity. Conclusory allegations of knowledge are fatal at the preliminary objection and judgment on the pleadings stage under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b).
• Mind integration clauses and the parole evidence rule. Absent express incorporation into the Agreement of Sale or a properly pleaded fraudulent-inducement claim, the Disclosures stay outside the four corners of the contract.
• Develop your appellate arguments. A one-paragraph argument with no citation to authority risks waiver under Pa.R.A.P. 2119.

Background

The dispute arose from the buyers’ 2017 purchase of a home in Wyomissing, Berks County, from the seller. Before closing, the buyers reviewed the Seller Disclosure Statement (the Disclosures) required by the Disclosure Law, 68 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 7301–7315, in which the seller indicated that the property had a working sump pump and sump pit and that she was not aware of any water infiltration into the basement or of any repairs to control water or dampness. The Disclosures did reveal a 2006 rehabilitation and addition (completed before the seller’s marriage and residence at the property) and a 2016 sewage backup that required new carpet, tile, and drywall.

Shortly after settlement, the buyers noticed flooding in the basement. They alleged that the property had a long history of basement flooding, that a waterproofing system had been installed after the addition, and that their remediation expert attributed the infiltration to an improperly constructed addition and post-addition landscape grading. The buyers were represented by their real estate agents (the Buyers’ Agents), while the seller was represented by her own agents (the Seller’s Agents).

The litigation and the trial court’s rulings

The buyers filed suit on March 23, 2020, asserting claims for violation of the Disclosure Law, civil conspiracy, fraud, breach of contract, negligence, and violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (UTPCPL). Over the ensuing five years, Judge Fudeman disposed of the case in stages.

Beginning in 2020, the Court dismissed the claims against the agents, sustaining preliminary objections in part, then granting judgment on the pleadings and, on April 13, 2022, summary judgment in favor of both the Buyers’ Agents and the Seller’s Agents. The Court also granted the seller’s motions in limine, excluding the Disclosures, any agreement other than the Agreement of Sale, and expert testimony. After an initial appeal was quashed as interlocutory and remanded, the Court entered its final order on May 7, 2025, granting the seller summary judgment on the Disclosure Law claim and judgment on the pleadings on the breach-of-contract, negligence, and UTPCPL counts.

In its accompanying opinion, the trial court interpreted the Disclosure Law as a statute of repose rather than a statute of limitations, thereby giving the buyers two years from the date of sale to sue. Because that period had run, the Disclosures were excluded, and since the buyers had relied solely on the Disclosures, the remaining claims could not be supported.

The appeal

The Superior Court affirmed on every issue.

As to the agents, the Court held that liability for nondisclosure turns on actual knowledge of a defect. The buyers’ theory that their agent “knew or should have known” of water infiltration, simply because she lived in the neighborhood, was conclusory and failed to meet the particularity that fraud requires under Pa.R.C.P. 1019(b). Because a licensee has no duty to inspect or independently verify a seller’s representations, and no evidence showed that the agents actually knew of the infiltration, the negligence, UTPCPL, and fraud claims against both the Buyers’ Agents and the Seller’s Agents could not survive.

The centerpiece of the opinion is the Disclosure Law analysis. Although Section 7311(b) is titled “Statute of limitations,” the Court held it operates as a statute of repose because its two-year clock runs from a fixed event, the final settlement, independent of any injury or its discovery. Following the Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Gidor v. Mangus, the Court explained that a statute’s title does not control its plain text, and that a repose period abolishes the cause of action entirely, so neither the discovery rule nor equitable tolling applies. Because the buyers filed roughly two years and eight months after settlement, the Disclosure Law claim was time-barred.

On an issue of first impression, the Court held that Disclosures barred by the repose period under the Disclosure Law cannot be used to support collateral claims. Because Section 7311(a) provides that the statute shall not be construed to “restrict or expand” other remedies, allowing a buyer to use the mandatorily disclosed Disclosures to prop up common-law and UTPCPL claims beyond the two-year window would impermissibly expand those remedies. The trial court, therefore, properly precluded use of the Disclosures to support the breach-of-contract, negligence, and UTPCPL claims.

The Court likewise upheld exclusion of the Disclosures under the parol evidence rule, because the Agreement of Sale contained an integration clause, did not expressly incorporate the Disclosures, and the buyers never pleaded the fraudulent-inducement exception. Finally, the buyers waived their challenge to the exclusion of their experts by failing to develop the argument or cite authority, as Pa.R.A.P. 2119 requires.

The full Superior Court opinion and Judge Fudeman’s trial court opinion are available for review of the detailed procedural history and legal analysis.