

Docket # 25-00437

Plaintiff Attorney(s): =M= Brian Achey 6108822111 59634: Tsarouhis Law Group LLC 21 S 9th Street Allentown PA 18102

Plaintiff Attorney(s): =E= Demetrios Tsarouhis 6106282440 88513

Party: Defendant WILFREDY MARTE 1615 COMMONWEALTH BLVD READING PA 19607

VELOCITY INVESTMENTS, LLC	:	IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF BERKS COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
Plaintiff/Appellant	:	CIVIL ACTION
	:	
v	:	NO. 25-437
	:	
WILFREDY MARTE	:	
Defendant/Appellee	:	ASSIGNED TO: JAMES E. GAVIN, J.

Demetrios H. Tsarouhis, Esquire, Attorney for Appellant, Velocity Investments, LLC
Wilfredy Marte, An Unrepresented Litigant

MEMORANDUM OPINION **April 2, 2026** **James E. Gavin, J.**

INTRODUCTION

This case presents the question of whether an exception to the general rules of civil procedure relating to the service of original process is self-executing. Having found that it is not and court approval is required, this Court set aside service by a third-party process server that was done without obtaining court authorization.

The Appellant disagrees and has filed the within appeal.

APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ERRORS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL

Following the filing of the Notice of Appeal, on March 2, 2026 the Court issued an order, that was docketed on March 4, 2026, directing the Appellant to file

a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal within twenty-one (21) days. On March 25, 2026, the Appellant filed a Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal asserting one (1) error stated as follows:

Did the lower court err, by and through its Order dated January 20, 2026 and entered January 21, 2026, deeming [Appellant's] service of its Complaint upon Defendant as improper and defective, where such service of [Appellant's] Complaint was made upon Defendant by Private Process Server, as specifically permitted under Pa.R.C.P. 4006(b)(4)[sic], and where [Appellant] and Defendant possessed complete diversity of jurisdiction, with Defendant a [sic] being a resident of Pennsylvania, and [Appellant] being a resident of New Jersey?

See Appellant's Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on Appeal, 3/25/2026.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

On January 14, 2025, the Appellant filed a collection complaint looking to collect \$4,645.45 from the Appellee, Wilfredy Marte. On February 5, 2025, the Appellant was notified that the sheriff did not successfully make service of the complaint. Thereafter on March 19, 2025, the Appellant filed a praecipe to reinstate the complaint.

Between March 19, 2025 and August 22, 2025, the docket remained inactive. On August 22, 2025, the Appellant filed a Declaration of Service of Praecipe to Reinstate Complaint, Notice to Defend, Complaint and Exhibits by handing to Luis Melendez (hereinafter referred to as the "Declaration"). Although filed on August 22, 2025, the Declaration was signed by a third-party process server on July 31,

2025. It also alleged that service was made on July 26, 2025 which was more than one hundred twenty (120) days after the complaint was reinstated.

Once again, the docket went inactive until December of 2025¹, at which time the Court questioned the propriety of service at a scheduled hearing. Thereafter, the Court issued a briefing schedule. In the meantime, the Appellant filed another Praecipe to Reinstate the complaint on December 22, 2025. On January 8, 2026, the Appellant filed an Affidavit of Service by a third-party process server indicating service on Luis Melendez.

¹ Rule 3.2 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct requires that all attorneys, "...shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client." *Pa.R.P.C. 3.2*. Article II (9) of the Pennsylvania Code of Civility imposes a duty on attorneys such that "[a] lawyer should be punctual and prepared for all court appearances." It also requires that, "A lawyer should be considerate of the time constraints and pressures on the court in the court's effort to administer justice and make every effort to comply with schedules set by the court." See Article II (11).

The Court of Common Pleas of Berks County, as is probably the case with many other counties, is inundated on an annual basis with an extraordinarily large number of small debt collection cases. Remarkably, this Court has found the lawyers that are handling these cases, including the lawyers in this case, treat the foregoing rules as little more than invitations or mere suggestions that they are free to ignore as opposed to directives they are required to follow.

The lawyers involved in this case are habitually late, are rarely prepared, and know very little about their cases. For reasons completely unclear to the Court, other than the occasional statement that a case "slipped through the cracks," or complaints about staffing issues, counsel fail to diligently prosecute their cases.

In addition to being a disservice to the courts and a failure to zealously advocate for their clients, counsel are placing the specter of "pending litigation" hanging over the heads of defendants, along with its potentially adverse credit impact, without notice or the opportunity to defend. Perhaps they deny liability or contend the debt was paid. The lack of diligence is fundamentally unfair.

Regardless of the outcome of this appeal, the dilatory conduct of Appellant's counsel reflects very poorly on them and negatively reflects upon the legal profession.

After an argument having been held, the Court entered an order finding that the service was not proper and struck it without prejudice to the Appellant's rights to reinstate the complaint and obtain proper service. In explaining its decision, the Court opined as follows:

Rule 400(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states, "original process shall be served within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff." *Pa.R.C.P 400(a)*. "It is well established that the rules governing the service of process set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil procedure must be strictly followed." *Township of Lycoming v Shannon*, 780 A.2d 835, 838 (*Pa.Cmwlth* 2001). There is no presumption as to the validity of service. See *Burger v Borough of Ingram*, 697 A.2d 1037, 1042 (*Pa.Cmwlth*. 1997). "[J]urisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is dependent upon proper service having been made." *Sharp v Valley Forge Medical Center & Heart Hospital*, 422 Pa. 124, 127, 221 A.2d 185, 187 (1966).

In this case, the Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to take advantage of an exception to the general rule that provides that original process may be served also by a competent adult in a civil action in which there is a complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants, and at least one defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania. See *Pa.R.C.P 400(b)(4)*. Without legal authority, the Plaintiff argues that this rule is self-effectuating. Further, it also essentially argues that sheriff service is inconvenient.

The Plaintiff argues that it is the Plaintiff, and the Plaintiff alone, who gets to decide whether this exception is invoked and to determine that there is complete diversity. This Court is of the opinion that Plaintiff argument is incorrect. In light of the important rights associated with the service of process, it is the opinion of the Court that if a party seeks to invoke the exception set forth in Rule 400(b)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure they are required to submit a request for service through a special order of court pursuant to Rule 430 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

See Court Order, 1/20/2026.

On January 28, 2026, the Appellant filed a Motion for Immediate Appeal with this Court, which was denied. On February 20, 2026, the Appellant filed the within appeal without seeking permission to appeal an interlocutory order.

DISCUSSION

This portion of this Memorandum Opinion will be divided into two (2) parts. In Part I, this Court will suggest that the appeal in this case should be quashed. In the event that a decision is made to hear the case, the Court will discuss the decision that it made in Part II.

I

Without proceeding with the merits of this appeal, the current appeal should be quashed. The law is clear that “[i]n this Commonwealth, an appeal may only be taken from: 1) a final order or one certified by the trial court as final; 2) an interlocutory order as of right; 3) an interlocutory order by permission; or 4) a collateral order.” *Mother’s Restaurant, Inc. v Krystkiewicz*, 861 A.2d 327, 331 (Pa.Super. 2004).

Since the appealed order did not put the Appellant out of court, it was not an appealable final order. Pursuant to Rule 341 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure, an appeal may be taken as right from a final order. A “final order” is an order that disposes of all claims and all parties. *Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1)*. To determine

whether finality has been achieved, a court must consider whether the practical ramification of the order will be to dispose of the case, thereby making review appropriate. *Friia v Friia*, 780 A.2d 664, 667 (Pa.Super. 2001). Stated differently, “A final order is generally one which terminates the litigation, disposes of the entire case, or effectively puts the litigant out of court.” *Hall v Lee*, 285 Pa.Super. 542, 544, 428 A.2d 178, 179 (1981).

An interlocutory order is appealable as of right if it fits within a narrow scope of orders defined by rule of court. See *Pa.R.A.P 311*. The interlocutory orders that are appealable by right include: orders affecting judgments, attachments, change of criminal venue or venire, injunctions, peremptory judgment in mandamus, new trials, partitions, and other cases in which an order is made final by statute or rule even though the order does not dispose of all of the claims and of all parties. *Id.* Because the order at issue in this case does not fit within the list of interlocutory orders that are appealable by right, the Appellant does not have a right to appeal.

This Court has also reviewed and considered whether the order is a collateral order which may be appealed as of right pursuant to Rule 313 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. *Pa.R.A.P 313*. A “collateral order” is an interlocutory that may be appealed as of right and is defined as “...an order separable from and collateral to the main cause of action where the right involved is too important to be

denied review and the question presented is such that if review is postponed until final judgment in the case, the claim will be irreparably lost.” *Pa.R.A.P. 313(b)*.

As the Superior Court has observed, what has become referred to as the collateral order doctrine is construed narrowly and each prong of the test must be met before an order may be considered appealable under the doctrine. *CAP Glass, Inc. v Coffman*, 130 A.3d 783, 787 (*Pa.Super.* 2016).

For purposes of defining an order as a collateral order under Rule 313, it is not sufficient that the issue be important to the particular parties. Rather it must involve rights deeply rooted in public policy going beyond the particular litigation at hand.

Geniviva v Frisk, 555 Pa. 589, 598, 725 A.2d 1209, 1213-1214 (1999).

The appealed order is not a collateral order that is appealable as of right. Since service of process and the requirement of notice are fundamental to due process, there is a serious question as to whether it is separable from and collateral to the main cause of action.

Finally, Rule 312 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure authorizes the taking of an appeal from an interlocutory appeal by permission. *Pa.R.A.P. 312*. Nevertheless, “[w]here an appellant seeking to appeal from an interlocutory order that is not appealable as of right fails to adhere to the procedure outlined in the rules, an appeal by permission is inappropriate.” *Estate of Considine v Wachovia Bank*, 966 A.2d 1148, 1153 (*Pa.Super.* 2009).

Chapter 13 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure governs the process for pursuing an appeal of an interlocutory appeal by permission. Specifically, a Petition for Permission to Appeal must be filed.

Permission to appeal from an interlocutory order listed in subdivision (a) may be sought by *filing a petition for permission to appeal with the prothonotary of the appellate court* within 30 days after entry of such order or the date of deemed denial in the trial court or other government unit with proof of service on all other parties to the matter in the trial court or other government unit and on the government unit or clerk of the trial court, who shall file the petition of record in such trial court. An application for an amendment of an interlocutory order to set forth expressly either the statement specified in 42 Pa.C.S. § 702(b) or the one in Pa.R.A.P. 341(c) shall be filed with the trial court or other government unit within 30 days after the entry of such interlocutory order, and permission to appeal may be sought within 30 days after entry of the order as amended. Unless the trial court or other government unit acts on the application within 30 days after it is filed, the trial court or other government unit shall no longer consider the application and it shall be deemed denied. If the petition for permission to appeal is transmitted to the prothonotary of the appellate court by means of first class, express, or priority United States Postal Service mail, the petition shall be deemed received by the prothonotary for the purposes of Pa.R.A.P. 121(a) (filing) on the date deposited in the United States mail, as shown on a United States Postal Service Form 3817 Certificate of Mailing, Form 3800 Receipt for Certified Mail, Form 3806 Receipt for Registered Mail, or other similar United States Postal Service form from which the date of deposit can be verified. The certificate of mailing or other similar Postal Service form from which the date of deposit can be verified shall be cancelled by the Postal Service, shall show the docket number of the matter in the trial court or other government unit, and shall be either enclosed with the petition or separately mailed to the prothonotary. The petitioner must file the original and one copy. Upon actual receipt of the petition for permission to appeal, the prothonotary of the appellate court shall immediately stamp it with the date of actual receipt. That date, or the date of earlier deposit in the United States mail as prescribed in this subdivision, shall constitute the date when permission to appeal was sought, which date shall be shown on the docket. The prothonotary of the appellate court shall immediately note the appellate docket number assignment upon the petition

for permission to appeal and give notice of the docket number assignment to the government unit or clerk of the trial court, to the petitioner, and to the other persons named in the proof of service accompanying the petition.

Pa.R.A.P. 1311(b)(Emphasis Added).

It does not appear that the Appellant has followed the requirements of filing a petition for permission to appeal an interlocutory order. Where an appellant fails to adhere to the procedures outlined on Chapter 13 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure and neglects to seek permission to appeal from an interlocutory order, the appeal must be quashed. *Patton v Hanover Insurance, Co.*, 417 Pa.Super. 351, 354, 612 A.2d 517, 518-519 (1992).

For all of the foregoing, we respectfully request that the appeal be quashed due to it involving an interlocutory appeal that the Appellant failed to follow the appropriate procedures to obtain permission to appeal.

II

In the event that the Honorable Superior Court of Pennsylvania determines that review is appropriate, the alleged error will be discussed in this section. In addressing the alleged error, this Court suggests that the Appellant does not fairly and accurately construe the decision reached by the Court. The decision of the Court was that the Appellant was required to seek court permission to take advantage of an exception to a general rule of civil procedure relating to service of process. The Appellant contends that the exception is self-executing.

By way of introduction, this Court is of the opinion that due process was never intended to be convenient. “Due process, reduced to its most elemental component, requires notice.” *Romeo v Looks*, 369 Pa.Super. 608, 616, 535 A.2d 1101, 1105 (1987). In the event that a plaintiff has failed to effectuate valid service and, as such, the defendant lacks notice of the proceedings against him, a court has no jurisdiction over the party and is powerless to enter judgment. *PNC Bank, N.A. v Unknown Heirs*, 929 A.2d 219, 228 (2007).

Rule 400(a) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure states, “original process shall be served within the Commonwealth only by the sheriff.” *Pa.R.C.P 400(a)*. “It is well established that the rules governing the service of process set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure must be strictly followed.” *Township of Lycoming v Shannon*, 780 A.2d 835, 838 (Pa.Cmwlth 2001). There is no presumption as to the validity of service. See *Burger v Borough of Ingram*, 697 A.2d 1037, 1042 (Pa.Cmwlth. 1997). “[J]urisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is dependent upon proper service having been made.” *Sharp v Valley Forge Medical Center & Heart Hospital*, 422 Pa. 124, 127, 221 A.2d 185, 187 (1966).

In this case, the Appellant argued that it is entitled to take advantage of an exception to the general rule that provides that original process may be served also by a competent adult in a civil action in which there is a complete diversity of

citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants, and at least one defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania. See *Pa.R.C.P. 400(b)(4)*². Without legal authority, the Appellant argued that it is allowed to avail itself of this rule without leave of court..

Thus, the more accurate question at issue in this appeal is who has the burden of establishing an exception to the general rule applies. Although the Court has not found any case law relating to the general rule at issue in this case, the Court has found a number of scenarios holding that the proponent of an exception to a general rule has the burden of establishing the applicability of the exception.

For example, in a very common scenario, a proponent seeking to admit into evidence an out of court statement upon an argument that it meets an exception to the hearsay rule bears the burden of proving the exception. See e.g. *Millcreek Township School District v Erie County Board of Assessment Appeals*, 140 A.3d 737, 741 (*Pa.Cmwlth.* 2016). In arena of medical malpractice, a plaintiff asserting fraudulent concealment as an exception to the general statute of limitations bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exception. See e.g. *Fine v Checcio*, 582

² As of the date of this Memorandum Opinion, Rule 400(b)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure is being considered for amendment by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Rules Committee with a proposed change reading, “a civil action in which there is a complete diversity of citizenship between all plaintiffs and all defendants, **[and] at least one defendant is a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the amount in controversy meets the Federal jurisdictional limit set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).**” (Proposed change in bold and underlined). See 56 Pa.B. 1564 (March 21, 2026).

Pa. 253, 271, 870 A.2d 850, 860 (2005). When dealing with a Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Hearing Act, it must be filed timely or demonstrate the applicability of an exception, with the burden of proving an exception is on the petitioner. See e.g. *Commonwealth v Copenhefer*, 596 Pa. 104, 107, 941 A.2d 646, 648 (2007). Finally, in personal injury litigation the discovery rule is also an exception to the statute of limitations and the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing the applicability of the exception to the general rule. See e.g. *Cappelli v York Operating Co., Inc.*, 711 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.Super. 1998).

Viewed collectively, each of the foregoing suggests a broad policy exists that a party seeking to invoke the powers of an exception to a general rule bears the burden of proving the applicability of the exception.

Discussing the purpose of the exception set forth in Rule 400(b)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania Civil Procedural Rules Committee has recently suggested that it was never intended to be used in small cases such as this one.

The amendment was intended to apply to those cases for which removal to Federal court was possible because the requirements for Federal diversity jurisdiction were met.

Notwithstanding, it was reported to the Committee that some litigants have been serving original process by a competent adult in certain cases that technically comply with the rule's stated requirements but were never its intended focus. To further limit the application of the rule to those cases that may be subject to removal to Federal court, the Committee proposes amending subdivision (b)(4) to allow service by the sheriff or a competent

adult in those civil actions that meet the diversity of citizenship requirements set forth in the rule and also meet the amount in controversy threshold for Federal diversity jurisdiction.

See *56 Pa.B. 1564* (March 21, 2026). Clearly, the Appellant's case was never intended to fall within the scope of Rule 400(b)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure due to the amount in controversy.

The only thing the Court did in this case is direct that a party seeking to invoke an exception to the general rule requiring sheriff service of original process needs to apply to the court for an order to do so. During argument before the Court, the Appellant argued that it was the Appellant, and the Appellant alone, who gets to decide whether this exception is invoked and to determine whether there is complete diversity.

This Court found that the Appellant's argument was not meritorious. In light of the important and fundamental rights of due process associated with the service of original process, it is the opinion of the Court that if a party seeks to deviate from the general rules and invoke the exception set forth in Rule 400(b)(4) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure they are required to submit a request for service through a special order of court pursuant to Rule 430 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure.

As the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania³ has stated:

³ Although it is true that decisions of the Commonwealth Court are not binding on the Superior Court, nevertheless it may rely on those decisions if it is persuaded by the reasoning. *Carmen Enterprises, Inc. v. Murpenter, LLC*, 185 A.3d 380, 393 n. 18 (Pa.Super. 2018).

In the absence of valid service, a court lacks personal jurisdiction over the party and is powerless to enter judgment against that party. *U.K. LaSalle, Inc. v. Lawless*, 421 Pa.Super. 496, 618 A.2d 447 (1992). Where service of process is defective, the remedy is to set aside the service. *Weaver v. Martin*, 440 Pa.Super. 185, 655 A.2d 180 (1995); *Frycklund v. Way*, 410 Pa.Super. 347, 599 A.2d 1332 (1991), *appeal denied*, 531 Pa. 654, 613 A.2d 560 (1992). In such a case, the action remains open, however, and the court must allow the plaintiff to attempt to make proper service of process on the defendant which would properly vest jurisdiction in the court.


City of Philadelphia v. Berman, 863 A.2d 156, 160 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2004).

In conclusion, the decision rendered by this Court only served to address the manner in which a specific exception to the rules relating to the service of process may be invoked. There being no error or abuse of discretion in the Court's ruling, we respectfully request that the decision of this Court be affirmed.

CONCLUSION


For all of the reasons set forth herein, we respectfully request the Appellant's appeal be quashed. In the alternative, we respectfully ask the Pennsylvania Superior Court to affirm the decision of this Court.

Respectfully Submitted,



James E. Gavin, J.

Notice of Language Rights



Language Access Coordinator
Berks County Services Center, 633 Court Street, 4th Floor, Reading, PA 19601
610-478-6208 x5712
Interpreter@berkspa.gov

English: You have the right to an interpreter at no cost to you. To request an interpreter, please inform court staff using the contact information provided at the top of this notice.

Spanish/Español: Usted tiene derecho a un intérprete libre de costo. Para solicitar un intérprete favor de informárselo al personal judicial utilizando la información provista en la parte superior de este aviso.

Mandarin/Cantonese Simplified Chinese/普通话/粤语简体中文: 您有权获得免费的口译员服务。若需要口译员, 请使用本通知上方提供的联系信息通知法院工作人员。

Mandarin/Cantonese Traditional Chinese/普通話/廣東話繁體中文: 您有權要求免費傳譯服務。如欲要求傳譯服務, 請參閱本通知頂部的聯絡資料。通知法庭職員。

Arabic/العربية: يحق لك الحصول على مترجم دون دفع أي تكلفة من جانبك. لطلب مترجم، يُرجى إعلام موظفي المحكمة باستخدام معلومات الاتصال المقدمة في الجزء العلوي من هذا الإشعار.

Russian/Русский: У вас есть право на бесплатные услуги переводчика. Заявка на переводчика подается в суд по адресу, телефону или эл. почте, указанным выше в заголовке этого уведомления.

Vietnamese/Tiếng Việt: Quý vị có quyền được một thông dịch viên giúp mà không tốn chi phí nào cả, xin hãy báo cho nhân viên tòa án dùng thông tin liên lạc có ở trên đầu thông báo này.

Nepali/नेपाली: तपाईंको निःशुल्क रूपमा भाषा अनुवादक राख्न पाउने अधिकार छ। अनुवादकको लागि अनुरोध गर्न, यस सूचनाको माथि दिइएको सम्पर्क जानकारी भरेर अदालतका कर्मचारीहरूलाई जानकारी दिनुहोस्।

Korean/한국어: 귀하는 비용에 대한 부담 없이 통역 서비스를 받을 권리가 있습니다. 통역 서비스를 요청하려면 본 통지서의 상단에 기재된 연락처를 통해 법원 직원에게 알리십시오.

Polish/Polski: Ma Pan/Pani prawo do nieodpłatnego skorzystania z usług tłumacza ustnego. Aby zwrócić się o wsparcie ze strony tłumacza ustnego, proszę skontaktować się z pracownikami sądu, korzystając z danych znajdujących się w górnej części niniejszego dokumentu.

Pakistan/پنجابی/Punjabi: تہاڈے کول بغیر ادائیگی کیتیاں اک مترجم حاصل کرن دا حق اے۔ مترجم دی درخواست کرن لئی، میربانی کر کے ایس نوٹس دے اوتے فراہم کیتیاں رابطے دیاں معلومات نوں ورتدیاں عدالت دے عملے نوں اطلاع دوو۔

Punjabi/ਪੰਜਾਬੀ/India: ਤੁਹਾਨੂੰ ਇੱਕ ਦੁਭਾਸ਼ੀਆ ਹਾਸਲ ਕਰਨ ਦਾ ਹੱਕ ਹੈ, ਜਿਸ ਦੀ ਤੁਹਾਨੂੰ ਕੋਈ ਲਾਗਤ ਨਹੀਂ ਲੱਗੇਗੀ। ਦੁਭਾਸ਼ੀਏ ਲਈ ਬੇਨਤੀ ਕਰਨ ਵਾਸਤੇ, ਕਿਰਪਾ ਕਰ ਕੇ ਅਦਾਲਤ ਦੇ ਅਮਲੇ ਨੂੰ ਜਾਣੂ ਕਰਵਾਓ ਤੇ ਇਸ ਲਈ ਇਸ ਨੋਟਿਸ ਦੇ ਸਿਖਰ ਉੱਤੇ ਦਿੱਤੀ ਸੰਪਰਕ ਜਾਣਕਾਰੀ ਦਾ ਇਸਤੇਮਾਲ ਕਰੋ।

Portuguese/Português: Você tem direito a um intérprete gratuitamente. Para solicitar um intérprete, informe à nossa equipe usando os dados de contato mostrados na parte superior deste aviso.

Somali/Somaali: Waxaad xaq u leedahay in lagu turjumo lacag la'aan ah. Si aad u codsato turjumaanka, fadlan u sheeg maxkamadda shaqaalaha adiga oo isticmaala macluumaadka ciwaanka kor lagu siiyay ee ogeysiiskaan.

Haitian Creole/Kreyòl Ayisyen: Ou gen dwa resevwa sèvis yon entèprèt gratis. Pou mande pou yon entèprèt, tanpri fè manm pèsònèl tribinal la konnen lè ou sèvi avèk enfòmasyon an yo te bay ou nan tèt avi sa a.

French/Français: Vous avez le droit de bénéficier gratuitement de l'assistance d'un interprète. Pour en faire la demande, veuillez en informer le personnel du tribunal à l'aide des coordonnées indiquées en haut de page.